Iran’s January 2026 nationwide internet blackout included active measures to disrupt Starlink satellite broadband, producing heavy packet loss and patchy service in many urban areas. Monitoring groups and on-the-ground researchers recorded a near-total external blackout beginning January 8, 2026, and independent analysts reported Starlink packet loss rising from roughly 30 percent to as high as 80 percent in some locations as jamming and GPS interference escalated.

From an electronic warfare perspective the Iranian response shows a layered, pragmatic approach to spectrum denial. Two tactics stand out. First, GNSS interference. Starlink terminals rely on GNSS for initial positioning and timing to align phased arrays and select the correct satellite and spot beam. Persistent GPS disruption degrades terminal acquisition and can force repeated reacquisition attempts, increasing latencies and packet loss. Analysts and digital rights monitors highlighted this mode of interference in the January events.

Second, localized RF jamming against user terminals and uplink/downlink bearers. Reports indicate Tehran deployed mobile jammers and other transportable emitters to impose high noise levels in the frequency bands Starlink uses for user links. A mobile, grid-deployed jamming scheme is tactically sensible for a state actor seeking control of urban centers: vehicle-mounted or truck-based emitters can move to protest hotspots, concentrate power where needed, and avoid committing scarce strategic assets to constant nationwide coverage. That approach is consistent with observations from independent monitors and the reporting on-site during the blackout.

Technical effects and operational tradeoffs

Jamming a LEO satcom user link is not the same as taking down a fiber backbone. Constellation geometry, user beamforming, and satellite handovers create a complex target set. A single, fixed-frequency, high-power jammer can overwhelm a terminal within its footprint, but the required power and density scale quickly if the adversary wants national coverage. Mobile jammers reduce that scaling problem by concentrating energy selectively in time and space. That produces a familiar patchwork: near-blackout in targeted neighborhoods and residual connectivity elsewhere, which is what monitors reported in Tehran. NetBlocks and other traffic monitors described external connectivity levels falling to roughly 1 percent of normal in some periods even while Starlink service remained intermittently available for a subset of users.

Civilian impacts and protection dilemmas

For civilians, the consequences were immediate and severe. The blackout cut banking rails, ride-hailing, emergency notification systems, and most methods for sending video and witness accounts to the outside world. Starlink had been a partial lifeline in prior events but during this shutdown users faced degraded throughput, higher latency, and the risk of detection and seizure. Authorities also reportedly conducted ground operations to locate and confiscate satellite terminals and dishes in some areas, increasing the personal risk of using unauthorized equipment. Human rights and digital rights organizations warned that the communications blackout could be used to shield security force actions from scrutiny.

Practical lessons for engineers, practitioners, and policy makers

1) Expect layered denial. States seeking to control information will combine core network cuts with active RF interference. Mitigation must address both the packet path and the RF domain. High-level monitoring, rapid diagnostics, and cross-domain indicators are essential to separate a routing-policy blackout from RF denial.

2) GNSS is a single point of weakness for many modern terminals. Resilience planning should treat GNSS disruption as likely in contested environments. From a systems design viewpoint, alternatives for bootstrapping and timing should be considered at the architecture stage, but these are complex changes that require coordination between terminal manufacturers, constellation operators, and regulators. Public reporting during the blackout emphasized the tactical value of GNSS disruption against user terminals.

3) Mobile jamming is a force multiplier. The tactical benefits for an operator are clear: mobility reduces beaconing requirements and forces defenders to chase moving sources. For civil operators and humanitarian actors this means situational awareness must include simple RF detection and geolocation feeds at a higher temporal resolution than commercial telemetry alone can provide. Independent monitoring groups and journalists were able to detect the pattern of patchy jamming; operational responders should build similar situational layers without exposing vulnerable populations to additional risk.

4) Monitoring and attribution matter. International monitoring groups documented traffic collapse and Starlink degradation in near real time. Those public telemetry threads were instrumental in naming the pattern of interference and pressuring international bodies to respond. Persistent, multi-source monitoring is essential for attribution and for building case histories that inform diplomatic and legal responses.

5) Policy and industry responses must balance resilience and safety. SpaceX and other operators face hard choices when service is used inside countries that have not authorized operations. During the January events SpaceX engaged with external actors and reportedly issued software adjustments to mitigate some interference effects, illustrating that constellation-level updates can blunt certain denial tactics but cannot make satcom invulnerable to a determined, high-power state adversary. Governments and firms need clear rules of engagement for emergency activations, export controls, and protections for end users.

Closing assessment

The Tehran protests and the associated January 2026 blackout demonstrated how a mid-sized state can combine old-school censorship with modern EW techniques to degrade satellite-based circumvention tools. The result is not an elegant technical victory for the jammer. It is a costly, escalatory, and temporary form of control that trades domestic economic pain for information denial. For engineers and policy makers the core takeaways are straightforward: design for GNSS disruption, build monitoring and attribution capability, and develop coherent industry-government policies for satellite-served resilience that prioritize civilian safety and legal safeguards.

Electronic warfare will continue to be a frontline instrument in the contest over information in contested environments. The technical community must treat these events as operational case studies, not as blueprints for escalation. Our responsibility is to harden civilian infrastructure, document abuse, and advise policy that constrains destructive uses of the spectrum while preserving essential communications for noncombatants.