A short video that circulated on Telegram and OSINT channels around January 1, 2025 drew attention not for explosions but for the electronic warfare fingerprint visible in its audio and overlays. The clip was distributed by channels that also posted New Year unmanned systems footage, and viewers quickly began asking what exactly was being shown and whether it represented a new EW technique or simply a frontline demo.
First, what you can reliably say from an unclassified open source clip. The recording contains three observable signal clues that are consistent with a deliberate EW engagement: abrupt loss of a control video stream followed by a burst of interference noise on-band, an audio track with intermittent carrier sweeps, and camera footage of a nearby antenna array being manhandled into position. From a tactical standpoint those three items point to a localized wideband emitter and operator intent to deny remoted video feeds to incoming small UAS. None of that requires access to classified logs to interpret.
Second, put the clip into the broader context of the front. By early 2025 Ukraine and Russia had both been using concentrated EW to blunt massed FPV and loitering munitions attacks. At the same time the adversaries were fielding non‑RF solutions that sidestep jamming, most notably fibre optic tethered drones and machine vision guided munitions. Those systems are explicitly designed to keep a high quality video link or remove the need for remote control altogether, which makes standard RF jamming much less effective. That reality explains why an EW operator demonstrating successful jamming of RF-linked drones remains operationally meaningful even while new countermeasures appear.
Third, a technical read of the signature. The most likely emitter class visible in the audio and metadata is a programmable wideband jammer that covers multiple FPV bands used by commercial and custom attack drones. The behavior in the clip fits a planned denial profile rather than indiscriminate broadband blasting. The operator appears to hit the most probable aggregate of 5.8 GHz FPV links and older 2.4 GHz command channels, then switches to short pulses in adjacent LTE bands to disrupt command repeaters or tethered control uplinks. That switching pattern is consistent with tactics taught in field EW courses: start with narrow, high‑power pulses to break handshakes, then escalate to sweeping noise for persistence while maintaining power discipline to avoid detection. These observations match the practical guidance practitioners were sharing publicly in 2024 and 2025.
Fourth, why the clip is tactically useful even if it is not spectacular. Demonstrating controlled denial in close proximity to friendly forces reassures units that EW can buy time to activate air defenses or to force hostile FPV operators to attempt multiple runs. The clip highlights two operational lessons that are still relevant. One, jamming is part of a kill chain. Jamming by itself does not destroy a threat but it changes the attacker’s cost and timing. Two, counters evolve quickly. When an opponent adopts fibre‑optic control or onboard autonomy, jamming becomes one node in a larger integrated defense that must include radar detection, kinetic interdiction, optical countermeasures, and tactics that exploit the limitations of tethered systems such as their drag and vulnerability to entanglement.
Fifth, what the clip does not prove. A short frontline video cannot reveal emitter hardware model, exact output power, or which frequency allocations were used. It cannot determine definitively whether a knocked down UAS crashed because of jamming or because of flight control loss caused by other effects. Analysts and hobbyists should avoid overclaiming. The open video is best treated as a deconstructable data point, not as a single definitive source. When OSINT channels bundle such clips with telemetry and RF captures the confidence of technical inferences rises.
Finally, practical takeaways for EW practitioners and interested engineers. If you are building or fielding defensive systems focus on integrated detection and layered defeat. Radar and passive RF detection are the sensors that reveal noncooperative airborne systems. Short, directed jamming that targets specific protocol handshakes is more efficient and tactically useful than blanket broadband noise. Prepare for an increasing number of non‑RF approaches from adversaries. Countering those will require hybrid solutions: radar or visual detection linked to intercept aircraft or loitering munitions, signal intelligence to map out operator patterns, and hardening of friendly systems against spoofing and GPS denial. Open source videos like the New Year clip matter because they let friends and foes alike validate tactics in the wild. Use them as raw material for training, not as a substitute for rigorous RF capture and lab testing.