The Krasukha-4 (1RL257) is a heavy, broadband mobile electronic attack system that Russia fields to deny airborne sensing and satellite-based reconnaissance over selected areas. It is built as a truck-mounted, two-part complex consisting of a containerized command/processing module and one or more high-power emitter units. The system is designed to interfere with airborne radars, some satellite electro-optical and SAR sensing chains, satellite communications in higher bands, and datalinks used by UAVs and ISR platforms.

Published technical summaries and open source analysis place Krasukha-4 in the class of large, high-power, broadband jammers. Reported operating bands focus on microwave and X/Ku/Ka ranges relevant to SAR, satellite comms, and many airborne radars; public figures for effective radii are commonly reported in the 150 to 300 kilometer range for specific mission profiles, with actual effect dependent on antenna orientation, output power, propagation, and target sensitivity. Those numbers should be treated as operational estimates derived from vendor and analyst reporting rather than hard engineering limits.

Open source reporting from the first months of the 2022 Ukraine conflict documented Ukrainian forces recovering at least a containerized module believed to be part of a Krasukha-4 near Kyiv. Multiple OSINT threads and news outlets described imagery of a camouflaged container that analysts identified as a command module. Western partners reportedly took interest in technical exploitation of that material for analysis. That capture helped push Krasukha-4 from a largely black box in Western analysis toward better characterized capability assessments.

Operationally in Ukraine and in other reported theaters, Krasukha-4 has been associated with three practical effects on adversary systems: localized denial of pushbutton satellite sensing and SATCOM uplinks, severe degradation of airborne early warning and surveillance radars within sector coverage, and intermittent disruption of drone command and control and some commercial satcom services. These effects are consistent with a high-power, sectorized emitter suite intended to produce either dense broadband noise or targeted deception against specific radar modes. Field reporting and analyst writeups describe the system as part of layered Russian EW and air defense integration.

There are three hard tactical tradeoffs to understand when discussing Krasukha-4 in the context of modern operations. First, high-power, wide-area jamming requires substantial electrical power and large antennas, which makes the system physically big and logistically heavy compared with tactical vehicle jammers. Second, wideband jamming that covers many sensors sacrifices spectral power density versus a narrowband, high-SERF threat to a single sensor; in short, you can jam many things moderately well or fewer things very strongly. Third, use of this class of emitter is visible in the electromagnetic spectrum and can be detected and geolocated by passive SIGINT arrays, which creates risk for the platform if adversary stand-off weapons or anti-radiation tactics are available. These tradeoffs are well understood in EW planning and are repeatedly highlighted in battlefield accounts.

For drone operators and spectrum planners the Krasukha-4 story is a practical lesson in both vulnerability and adaptation. Tactics that reduce the effectiveness of large strategic jammers include reducing reliance on single-architecture datalinks, adding multi-path or store-and-forward comms, adopting frequency agility and low probability of intercept waveforms, and using passive sensing and data fusion so the mission does not depend on continuous SATCOM or a single radar cue. Stand-off weapons and dispersed ISR make kill chains less dependent on a single sensing node and therefore more resilient to denial. At the same time, many of these mitigations impose cost, complexity, and tradeoffs in platform endurance and payload.

From a counter-EW perspective, the primary options against a Krasukha-class system are: passive localization and targeting using distributed SIGINT; hardening and frequency diversity of critical links; tactical use of low-frequency sensors that are less affected by Ku/Ka/X-band jamming; and physical counteraction when feasible, either by long-range stand-off munitions or by targeting support and logistics nodes. Intelligence exploitation of captured hardware or fragments is also a force multiplier for developing tailored countermeasures and emission control profiles.

Finally, there is a civil and policy angle to keep in mind. Heavy spectrum denial systems do not distinguish between military and high-value commercial or humanitarian SATCOM and microwave services when emit power is sufficient. That creates second-order effects on commercial operations, emergency communications, and civilian remote sensing in contested regions. Spectrum managers and providers operating in or near high-intensity conflict zones must build contingency routing and survivable service profiles into their designs to avoid mission failure when a high-power jammer is present.

Bottom line: Krasukha-4 is emblematic of the modern approach to area denial in the electromagnetic domain. It is not a magic weapon that permanently blinds an adversary. Instead it is a heavy, high-payoff tool in layered EW and air defense architectures that forces adversaries to change sensing, comms, and strike tactics. For operators and engineers the correct response is not to chase a single silver-bullet countermeasure but to build redundancy, spectral diversity, and passive sensing into systems so that critical functions survive when heavy jammers are introduced into the battlespace.