Overview Iranian electronic warfare activity through the first half of 2025 shows two complementary trends. Tehran is hardening its own aerial platforms against jamming and spoofing while simultaneously conducting spectrum operations that have produced observable navigation and communications disruptions in the Gulf and adjacent areas. These moves expand Iran’s asymmetric toolkit and change operational assumptions for any platform that relies on GNSS and line of sight datalinks.

What changed recently

  • Drone hardening. Iran publicly showed upgraded navigation and antenna suites on the Shahed-149 “Gaza” wide body drone at LAAD 2025 in April 2025. Iranian reporting and imagery identify new antennas and navigation receivers described as anti-jamming and anti-spoofing additions intended to preserve PNT and control in contested electromagnetic environments.
  • Mass fielding of UAS. Iran reported large deliveries of unmanned aerial systems earlier in 2025, increasing the number of platforms that benefit from both jamming capability and anti-jam hardening. Larger UAS inventories raise the operational value of spectrum denial and the incentive to invest in PNT resiliency.
  • Maritime and regional GNSS disruption. Multiple merchant vessels and maritime authorities reported GPS interference in the Strait of Hormuz in March 2025, with broader spikes in GNSS disruption observed in the region during June 2025. Those events affected commercial navigation systems and produced a measurable operational impact across shipping lanes.
  • EW equipment posture. Iran’s services signaled a steady program of EW development and public unveilings in 2025, with military leaders announcing forthcoming electronic warfare systems and the navy promoting new EW-capable platforms. Those announcements align with observed activity at sea and increased investment in drone resilience.

Technical read on the field The disruptions being reported are consistent with a mix of jamming and spoofing techniques rather than a single attack profile. Simple wideband jammers will raise the noise floor and deny GNSS lock over a radius proportional to transmitter power and antenna gain. Spoofing requires a different execution profile but can create false position fixes and produce more dangerous navigational errors when executed well. Iran’s countermeasures on UAS appear to follow common receiver hardening recipes: multi constellation GNSS receivers, upgraded antennas that resemble controlled reception pattern arrays, and improved local filtering and RAIM style integrity checks. Operators seeing imagery and vendor claims should assume these upgrades make low-power or single-antenna jammers less effective and force defenders to escalate to higher effective jamming power or different attack techniques.

Tactical implications for ISR, drones and maritime operations

  • ISR and long endurance UAS. Persistent ISR platforms that depend on GNSS and beyond line of sight datalinks are vulnerable in contested areas where Iran elects to apply electronic pressure. Expect reduced mission persistence, occasional loss of precise geolocation metadata, and the need to switch to inertial or manual navigation modes. Operators should not assume continuous GNSS integrity inside the Persian Gulf region in 2025.
  • Effects on civilian shipping. Commercial vessels reported multi-hour GNSS disruptions that forced reliance on contingency navigation. That is a pure safety of navigation issue that raises collision risk in congested choke points. Ports and ship operators must treat GNSS outages as operationally normal for certain areas and plan accordingly.
  • Cat and mouse escalation. As Iranian UAS get better anti-jam kits, adversaries will shift to alternate counters such as higher-power jamming, tailored spoofing, optical terminal guidance, passive RF detection, or cyber and kinetic means to regain effect. Expect incremental adaptation rather than single decisive breakthroughs.

Recommended mitigations and operator checklist For military and governmental operators

  • Assume degraded GNSS. Build mission plans that do not require continuous GNSS integrity over the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters. Exercise inertial-only navigation legs and manual recovery procedures.
  • Harden receivers. Use multi constellation receivers, CRPA or similar antenna systems, tightly integrated INS with periodic external fixes, and robust RAIM/RAIM-like integrity monitoring. Prioritize anti-spoof filters and cross-checks between sensors.
  • Datalink resilience. Use directional or hopping datalinks, add message authentication, and maintain secondary comms paths to reduce the efficacy of wide area jamming.
  • Deception awareness. Train crews to recognize plausible spoofing behaviors and design mission logic to reject sudden large jumps in position or time without corroborating sensors.

For commercial maritime operators and hobbyists

  • Update contingency plans. Masters should train for multi hour GNSS loss and be competent with radar, visual, and celestial or terrestrial navigation backups. Shipping operators need PNT redundancy and shore liaison plans for port approaches.
  • Do not experiment with jamming. Jamming is illegal in most jurisdictions and dangerous to life and property. Civilian hobbyists must never attempt transmitters intended to deny GNSS or radio links.

What to watch next

  • Hardware proliferation. Track component flows and imagery for increases in multi element antennae and CRPA style packages on Iranian or exported UAS. Those changes materially alter the effectiveness curve for simple jamming tools.
  • EW doctrine and employment. Monitor Iranian service statements and parade unveilings for new truck or ship mounted EW suites. Public announcements and domestic trade show appearances often precede or mirror operational deployments.
  • Maritime incident data. Watch UKMTO and industry reporting for repeat GNSS interference clusters. Pattern analysis of duration, geographic centroid, and frequency occupation will reveal whether incidents are tactical harassment or part of sustained spectrum campaigns.

Bottom line Iran is simultaneously hardening its own aerial capabilities while employing spectrum denial and disruption that has tangible operational effects in the Gulf. The resulting environment penalizes operators who rely on a single PNT or datalink source and rewards layered, crosschecked navigation and authenticated communications. For engineers and operators that means invest in multi sensor navigation, anti-jam antenna systems where legal and practical, and real world training for GNSS degraded operations.