This brief translates core Internet Society policy positions into practical policy and operational guidance for electronic warfare practitioners. The goal is not to advocate for or against specific operations, but to show how widely circulated Internet policy norms intersect with EW activities, especially when those activities touch civilian communications, community networks, and encryption-dependent services.

Multistakeholder governance matters for EW policy. The Internet Society has long argued that the Internet functions best when policy and technical decisions are made through open, inclusive multistakeholder processes rather than closed, single-stakeholder fiat. Practically this means regulators, technical operators, civil society, and industry all share responsibility for outcomes that affect stability and resilience. For EW professionals this is important because spectrum, interference rules, and emergency communications policy are shaped in these fora; engagement there changes the legal and operational environment you will face.

Encryption and the rejection of mandated backdoors are core Internet Society tenets. The Internet Society explicitly treats strong encryption as the norm for traffic and warns against government-mandated backdoors or designed vulnerabilities. Those policy principles reflect a larger technical consensus that exceptional access schemes or systemic weakening of cryptography create exploitable failure modes that harm ordinary users, critical infrastructure, and investigative integrity alike. EW teams that consider capabilities to defeat encryption must weigh not only technical feasibility but the broad policy and safety consequences described by the Internet engineering and security communities.

Spectrum access policy increasingly prioritizes affordable, localized options. Internet Society work on community-centered connectivity highlights that community networks and small operators depend on equitable spectrum access, license-exempt bands, and flexible licensing models. Policy recommendations include toolbox approaches such as unlicensed use, local licenses, use-it-or-share-it rules, and dynamic spectrum assignment to reduce exclusional effects of large national auctions. These regulatory trends matter to EW because they increase the number and diversity of legitimate spectrum users that can be affected by interference or experimental EW activity. Planning must account for more stakeholders on the air.

The Internet Society’s operational agenda ties these points together. In its organizational plans and advocacy, Internet Society activity emphasizes extending encryption, securing routing, and opposing fragmentation of the global Internet. That institutional emphasis signals where policy fights will be active and where civil society and technical groups will push back on proposals that could weaken security or restrict interoperability. EW practitioners should track these advocacy themes because they will influence national and international regulatory choices that constrain operations.

Operational implications and risk mitigations for EW practitioners 1) Anticipate a protective policy baseline for encryption. Public policy and technical consensus disfavors legally required backdoors. If your work contemplates creating systems that rely on systemic interception of encrypted communications, expect significant legal pushback and technical obstacles. Wherever possible focus on lawful intercept methods that do not assume weakening of global cryptographic standards.

2) Recognize civilian spectrum users and community networks as high collateral risk. Community networks, municipal Wi-Fi, CBRS-like shared frameworks, and expanded unlicensed bands increase the density of legitimate users in many bands. Unauthorized, experimental, or poorly coordinated EW emissions can produce outsized societal harm in these contexts. Build risk assessments that explicitly enumerate community network presence and potential civilian service degradation.

3) Coordinate with multistakeholder processes and regulators early. Engagement in national spectrum consultations, local licensing pilots, and technical working groups is practical risk management. Early participation allows EW programs to explain safety controls, emergency fail-safes, and test constraints so regulators can craft permissions that balance safety and mission needs.

4) Implement strict collateral-damage controls in fieldwork. Before any active emission tests or jamming exercises outside contained ranges, perform: spectrum occupancy scans; stakeholder notification; written authorization from the relevant spectrum authority; and documented monitoring for unintended interference. If operations could affect critical infrastructure or emergency services, require higher-level legal review and post-test incident reporting. Cite and follow local rules for spectrum use; policy documents on community access show how regulators treat these uses as public goods.

5) Use testbeds and shielded ranges for invasive research. When testing capabilities that would intrude on or defeat protective controls such as encryption or authenticated routing, use isolated labs, shielded ranges, or simulation environments. Public trust and policy actors are sensitive to research that demonstrates practical degradations of widely used protections. Keeping experiments off public airwaves reduces regulatory and reputational risk.

6) Preserve and document chain of custody for data accessed in operations. If lawful intercept or other operations yield data that could be used in legal or policy disputes, maintain auditable records, minimization procedures, and retention policies consistent with privacy and human rights expectations. The broader Internet community sees privacy protections and lawful process as mutually reinforcing with security.

Concrete policy engagement steps for the EW community

  • Map the stakeholder landscape for the bands you operate in. Identify community networks, municipal deployments, and license-exempt incumbents before planning exercises.
  • Submit technical comments in national spectrum consultations. Provide measured proposals for temporary access regimes, geographic exclusion zones, and emergency notification protocols.
  • Advocate for carve-outs in testing frameworks that require pre-notification, monitoring, and remediation funding when civilian services are impacted. Document costs and propose mitigation clauses.
  • Publicly commit to not designing or demanding systemic weaknesses in encryption. Operational capabilities that depend on such weakening are likely to be unsustainable and attract cross-sector resistance.

Bottom line Internet Society policy positions converge on a few predictable outcomes: strong encryption as the norm, inclusive multistakeholder policy processes, and spectrum regimes that broaden access for community actors. For EW professionals these trends raise the bar for lawful, responsible, and minimally disruptive operations. The practical path is clear. Plan to protect civilian services, engage regulators and civil society early, use contained test environments for high-risk research, and avoid approaches that rely on systemic weakening of security. Those practices reduce legal and operational friction, and they align EW activity with the public interest in a resilient, interoperable communications environment.