Air Combat Command is the Air Force component charged with organizing, training, and equipping forces that perform electronic warfare as an integral part of air, space, and cyberspace operations. ACC combines airborne electronic-attack platforms, spectrum warfare units, and command and control enablers to deliver effects that deny, degrade, or manipulate an adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
At the platform level ACC has been modernizing its airborne electronic-attack fleet with the EA-37B Compass Call. The EA-37B is a rehost of the Compass Call mission system onto a Gulfstream G550 derivative and is intended to replace the legacy EC-130H fleet. The new airframe gives ACC higher altitude and much greater transit speed, while preserving the mission set: wide area communications and radar jamming, suppression of enemy air defenses through denial of links between sensors and shooters, and offensive counterinformation operations. ACC has stood up initial training and operational units to transition crews to the EA-37B and plans for a relatively small buy compared with historical demands.
ACC’s operational construct for EW is not just aircraft centric. In recent years the command has consolidated EW expertise into specialized wings and groups to accelerate capability delivery and training. The 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing is an ACC organization focused on fielding, sustaining, and integrating electronic warfare capabilities across the Combat Air Forces. That wing and other spectrum-focused organizations are intended to provide technical depth, exercise support, and rapid fielding of countermeasures so that ACC components can inject credible EMS effects into joint operations.
On the command and control side the Air Force has been reorganizing units to link airborne EW platforms, airborne communications relays, and targeting cells. The activation and reflagging of squadrons that assume Battlefield Airborne Communications Node and electronic combat responsibilities underscore ACC’s push to blend communications extension, EW, and joint all-domain command and control in theater. Facilities such as the Battle Management Combined Operations Complex at Robins AFB are being stood up to consolidate those functions for cohesive planning and execution.
Tactically ACC’s EW missions fall into three broad buckets. First, offensive electronic attack. These missions use airborne emitters to deny enemy C2, communications, and targeting radars in support of strike and maneuver forces. Compass Call is the canonical example of this effect. Second, spectrum operations and defense. Units under spectrum warfare wings perform spectrum management, emitter characterization, and fielding of countermeasure kits for manned and unmanned platforms. Third, enabling and sustaining joint connectivity. BACN style relay aircraft and other comms enablers keep joint sensors and shooters linked when contested. Successful operations require choreography between these buckets to produce a synchronized multi-domain effect.
Operational lessons that have driven ACC changes are practical and predictable. EW must be integrated early in planning and exercises, not treated as an afterthought. Training ranges, instrumentation, and realistic threat emitters are necessary so crews can practice the timing and layering of effects. The combination of legacy systems, rehosted mission aircraft, and new spectrum units creates a mixed logistics and training footprint that must be managed if ACC wants sustained, high tempo ops. Senior leaders in ACC have emphasized that electromagnetic spectrum dominance is a requirement across exercises and contingencies.
From a tactical practitioner perspective there are two important implications. One, the EA-37B and similar aircraft are tools for theater shaping and tactical execution but they require precise integration with strike packages, ISR, and cyber effects to avoid fratricide of communications or unintended collateral impacts on allied systems. Two, the relatively small planned Compass Call fleet and high demand signal the need to design EW plans that do not rely on single-asset solutions. Distributed EW, delegated authorities to lower echelons for localized EMSO, and robust training with joint partners all mitigate capacity shortfalls.
For engineers and hobbyists studying ACC missions take away these points. Study effect-based planning where an EW action is defined by the adversary function to be changed. Understand how platform constraints such as altitude, speed, and power impact emitter footprint and dwell time. And when experimenting with RF gear follow legal boundaries and safety processes. EW in the wild carries operational risk and legal consequences if conducted without authorization. ACC’s evolution shows the service is moving toward a layered, systems approach where aircraft, spectrum wings, and C2 nodes operate as parts of a single EMS fight, not as disconnected pieces.
Bottom line: ACC has been modernizing its EW toolset and reorganizing to treat the electromagnetic spectrum as a full domain of warfare. The Compass Call rehost and the consolidation of spectrum warfare units are practical responses to the operational realities of peer and near peer competition. For planners the emphasis is clear. Integrate EW early, design for distributed effects, and align training and sustainment so EW can be applied reliably when the joint force needs it most.