The digital battlefield is not a hypothetical future. It is the present fight where electromagnetic control, cyber effects, and distributed sensing decide whether forces can sense, shoot, and survive. Tactics that work in permissive environments fail quickly when an opponent actively contests the electromagnetic spectrum. This piece lays out practical tactics and architectural prescriptions you can apply at unit and system level to operate under that contest.

Core principle: integrate cyberspace and EW into a single warfighting function. The Army codified this as Cyber Electromagnetic Activities or CEMA. Treat EW, cyberspace effects, and spectrum management as intentionally synchronized tools to seize and retain advantage rather than as separate stovepipes. That shift is doctrine and it changes tactical tradeoffs: denial, deception, exploitation, and protection must be planned together and executed to support kinetic maneuver.

Why the spectrum matters for the digital fight. Modern networks, sensors, precision weapons, and unmanned systems all depend on the electromagnetic spectrum for command, control, sensing, and navigation. Losing effective access to the EMS breaks situational awareness and the kill chain. Achieving spectrum superiority is therefore a foundational enabler for multi-domain command and control architectures. Put bluntly, you cannot win the digital fight if your platforms cannot talk, see, or guide.

Threat character and tactical implications. Expect adversaries to combine three approaches: 1) wideband and targeted jamming to blind radios, GNSS, and radars; 2) cyber operations to corrupt data and sensor chains; and 3) autonomous, hard-to-jam weapons that reduce reaction time. Recent exercises and field tests have shown that commercial counter-UAS and detection systems degrade rapidly under sustained EMS attack. That implies two tactical imperatives: reduce reliance on any single sensing modality and shorten the detection-to-engagement timeline.

Tactical playbook, short form.

  • Layered detection. Combine passive RF direction finding, short-range radar tuned for small-RCS targets, and EO/IR cameras with neural-network-based classification. Fusion wins when a single sensor is jammed. Prioritize fusion that can run locally on edge processors so detection persists when networks fail.
  • Spectrum agility. Design radios and sensors to sense and move. Frequency agility, adaptive beamforming, and LPI techniques reduce exposure to straight-line jamming. Build rules for automatic fallback modes that switch to pre-authorized, narrowband links or optical/line-of-sight relays when contested.
  • System of systems for defeat. No single defeat mechanism is universally effective. Combine non-kinetic options — selective jamming, cyber takeover of hostile links, spoofing where lawful and effective — with low-collateral kinetic options and directed energy when feasible. Orchestrate them through a layer manager that enforces priority and deconfliction. Real-world tests demonstrate the need for this layered approach.
  • Harden the command and data plane. Assume your primary networks will be attacked. Maintain out-of-band command channels, authenticated peer-to-peer data links, and tamper-evident black-box logging on critical nodes. Use cryptographic telemetry and safe-mode behaviors that allow systems to continue with minimal but trustworthy situational awareness when degraded.

Dismounted and small-unit tactics. Units must expect degraded GNSS and intermittent comms. Train soldiers to operate on a degraded kill chain with these concrete practices:

  • Preplanned maneuvers tied to time, not continuous comms. Use mission-type orders and timed triggers for actions when links fail.
  • Visual and EO/IR cues as alternative targeting cues for handheld interceptors and rifle-mounted systems.
  • Lightweight local fusion nodes that aggregate sensors from a squad or vehicle and provide a single trusted track file for engagement decisions. These reduce the exposure window created when adversary autonomy severs command links beyond short ranges.

Architectural recommendations for force designers.

  • Design for graceful degradation. Systems must provide usable capability in reduced modes, not binary up/down behavior.
  • Edge-first processing. Push classification and triage to the edge to avoid a fragile central node.
  • Open interfaces and standardized APIs. A plug-and-play sensor and effector ecosystem enables rapid reconfiguration and layered defenses during an engagement.
  • Autonomous assist, not autonomy alone. AI should prioritize threat triage and cue human decisions, with pre-authorized autonomous responses for tightly bounded scenarios.

Training and test prescriptions. Exercise in contested EMS. Demonstrations that simulate sustained, wideband jamming expose brittle designs and force the system-of-systems approach. Recent DoD-sponsored tests have stressed C-UAS and counter-EW interplay and concluded that no single system is a silver bullet. You need iterative, instrumented live tests that replicate real-world multispectral interference to tune algorithms, thresholds, and human-machine interfaces.

Rules of thumb for commanders and program managers.

  • Assume the enemy can blind at least one major sensing family. Invest in complementary sensors.
  • Prioritize kill-chain shortening over marginal improvements in single-sensor range. Speed often beats raw range in a contested EMS environment.
  • Budget for resilience. Redundancy, hardened comms, and spectrum-deconfliction tools are cost-effective compared to replacing lost platform capability.

Limits, legal and ethical notes. Non-kinetic operations such as spoofing or cyber takeovers carry legal and airspace safety constraints in many jurisdictions. Field practice must include legal review and safety protocols, especially in homeland protection or operations near civilian airspace. Documented test frameworks and interagency coordination are necessary before fielding these tactics in domestic contexts.

Actionable checklist to get started. 1) Map your EMS dependencies across platforms and sensors. Identify single points of failure. 2) Run a table-top CEMA disruption scenario and codify fallback modes. 3) Add at least one complementary sensor per critical detection function and ensure local fusion capability. 4) Implement spectrum-agile communications on priority nodes and test failover to out-of-band links. 5) Schedule live, contested-spectrum tests to validate tactics and update doctrine.

Closing. The digital battlefield rewards those who design systems to survive in a denied and degraded environment. That means planning CEMA deliberately, fusing multiple sensors, shortening the detection-to-engagement timeline, and accepting that layered defenses and graceful degradation are more important than a single high-performance sensor. These are practical, implementable changes that shift risk away from brittle capability stacks and toward resilient, mission-oriented systems.