Over the last six months a steady drip of open-source reporting and OSINT has argued that Russia has moved at least some advanced electronic warfare capabilities into Iranian hands or provided Iran with the technical means to field close analogues. The most prominent claim centers on the long-range Murmansk-BN communications jamming complex being transferred to Iran, with follow-on reporting and commentary tying that claim to a broader pattern of hardware deliveries and technical cooperation.

What has been reported

  • Murmansk-BN. Multiple outlets reported in early August 2024 that Murmansk-BN communications jammers were sent to Iran, citing flight activity and regional reporting that pointed to IL-76 transport missions and other movements. Those reports describe Murmansk-BN as a multi-truck HF communications jamming and interception system with very long distance effects when employed against skywave HF and certain satellite link architectures.

  • Complementary/earlier signals. Russian officials publicly acknowledged in April 2024 that radiolocation and electronic warfare items were on the table for supply to Iran where such items are not prohibited by existing bans. That statement represented an official admission that EW-related transfers were within Moscow’s export toolkit.

  • Indigenous Iranian systems and reverse engineering. Iran has been fielding larger, truck-mounted EW complexes such as the so-called Cobra-V8, which independent analysts note looks and behaves like a Krasukha-class airborne-radar and SATCOM jamming capability. That raises two possibilities that are not mutually exclusive: direct Russian delivery of systems, or deep technical assistance and license-style transfers that let Iran produce Krasukha-like gear domestically. Open-source technical comparisons and imagery have driven that discussion.

Evidence quality and caveats

Open-source claims from the summer of 2024 fall into three buckets: local/regional press and OSINT reports that identify equipment movements; commercial defense outlets and EW specialists that compare hardware and antenna layouts; and official Russian statements describing the permissibility of radiolocation and EW sales. The combined picture is coherent but not uniformly definitive. Direct photographic proof from reliable independent imagery agencies and confirmations from the supplying or receiving governments were limited as of early September 2024. In short, there is credible reporting and technical analysis pointing toward substantive transfers or close technical cooperation, but public, irrefutable documentation of full operational handover and local training remains sparse.

What these systems do, in practical terms

  • Long-range HF COMJAM and SIGINT. Murmansk-BN is profiled in open sources as optimized for HF skywave interception and suppression. In theater, HF jamming can degrade long-distance command links, certain maritime datalinks, and legacy strategic communication networks such as the HFGCS that carry high-value C2 traffic. In a crisis that kind of capability complicates allied and partner battle management and long-range messaging.

  • Radar and SATCOM denial. Krasukha-class and Krasukha-like systems attack airborne radars and certain satellite-borne sensors, including SAR and some SATCOM terminals operating in X-Ku band frequencies. A working Krasukha analogue in Iran would blunt airborne ISR and complicate the employment of AWACS, Rivet Joint, and many UAVs that rely on SATCOM or X-band radar modes. Those effects are highly dependent on geometry, power-on time, and emitter libraries, but the qualitative impact on ISR and precision-guided operations can be large.

Implications for drone operations and contested-spectrum tactics

If Iran is operating Murmansk-class COMJAM or Krasukha-like radar jammers, the tactical consequences are immediate for both state and non-state actors who rely on GNSS, single-link SATCOM, or narrowband datalinks. Practical mitigations at the tactic and engineering level include:

  • Diversify navigation and timing sources. Use multi-constellation GNSS combined with inertial navigation systems and dead-reckoning to reduce single-point GNSS vulnerability.
  • Multi-path comms. Build redundancy into command and telemetry by using complementary datalinks such as LOS radio, SATCOM, and bursty, frequency-hopping links. Avoid single-link dependency for critical guidance.
  • Anti-jam antennas and CRPA. Controlled reception pattern antennas and robust anti-jam front ends raise the bar against wide-area jamming, although they add weight, cost, and complexity.
  • Passive sensing and fusion. Rely more on passive ISR and sensor fusion to preserve situational awareness when active sensors or data links are degraded.
  • Mission design trade-offs. Use swarm tactics with expendable decoys, shorter loitering paths within non-jammed corridors, and preprogrammed terminal behaviors when comms are lost.

Those approaches are standard engineering responses, but they require industrial inputs and sensible doctrine to be effective in real operations.

Legal, policy and export-control angle

Official Russian language reporting and statements from Moscow stressed that only items not on ban lists would be supplied. That is a reminder that much of this activity sits in gray areas of export control and diplomatic signaling. Transfers of advanced EW systems to a state engaged in volatile regional competition raises sanctions and proliferation questions and complicates attempts to restrict dual-use technology flows. Operators and hobbyists should be especially cautious about experimentation near frequencies and equipment tied to military-grade EW; the legal exposure and safety risk are real.

Bottom line assessment

As of early September 2024 the best public record supports a high-confidence conclusion that Russia and Iran stepped up EW cooperation in 2024. That cooperation appears to include the movement of heavy EW concepts and possibly whole systems, plus a clear pattern of technical cross-pollination and local indigenization. The operational consequence is that Tehran’s ability to contest portions of the spectrum at long range has materially increased on paper and in open reporting. However, the absence of unambiguous, independently verified imagery of fully staffed, Russian-operated complexes in Iranian service means some uncertainty remains about scale and persistent operational status.

For engineers, hobbyists and field operators

Treat the reports as a tactical reality that will shape the operating environment. Prioritize resilience in navigation and comms, invest in anti-jam hardware where mission critical, and design layered redundancy into control links. For researchers and commentators, separate three questions: what was delivered, who operates it, and how routinely it is used. Answering those requires continued OSINT, signals collection, and the sort of disciplined imagery analysis that has carried the best reporting to date.

If nothing else, the episode is a reminder that EW capability is mobile technology. The transfer or co-development of ground-based jammers and emitter libraries changes the local electronic order of battle quickly, and it is the signal processing and doctrine around those systems that determine whether they are a strategic game-changer or a tactically disruptive but limited capability.