The last five years have produced a new class of dismounted electronic-warfare (EW) tools intended to give infantry units local control of the electromagnetic battlespace. This review focuses on practical capability, tactical employment, and the operational tradeoffs you need to understand when you consider fielding man-portable RF and counter-UAS systems.

Platform categories and what they actually do

Two product families dominate open reporting on dismounted defeat effects. First are handheld RF disruptors commonly called antidrone rifles or jamming guns. These are purpose-built to deny command-and-control links, interrupt video feeds, and, in some cases, interfere with GNSS. Their design emphasis is directional antennas, battery power, and minimal setup so an individual operator can engage quickly. Second are vehicle- or trailer-scaled high-power microwave (HPM) systems intended for one-to-many counter-electronics missions; these are not shoulder-fired but are part of expeditionary short-range air defense mixes and represent a different set of tradeoffs in logistics and safety. For representative handheld specifications and operational descriptions see manufacturer materials for the DroneGun family.

How effective are handheld jammers in the field

Handheld RF disruptors can be tactically decisive against small commercial quadcopters that rely on standard ISM bands or GNSS. When properly aimed they deny video and control or force a controlled land/return-to-home in many consumer platforms. Effective range and reliability vary widely by transmitter power, antenna gain and the target’s link architecture. Real-world reports from contested environments show that low-power Western off-the-shelf guns sometimes perform inconsistently against custom FPV rigs or modified frequency-hopping systems, which drives a need for combined detection, classification and selective effect. Field teams should expect useful standoff ranges measured in hundreds of meters under ideal geometry, with degraded performance against hardened or line-of-sight-obstructed targets.

HPM and the scalability question

High-power microwave systems operate on a different physical principle. Rather than narrowband jamming they deposit broadband energy to upset electronics within a defined volume. These systems are attractive because they offer one-to-many defeat against swarms and diversified platform types without needing to match the target’s control channel. They also carry heavier power, cooling and safety burdens and are almost always mounted on a vehicle, trailer or static emplacement rather than carried by an individual soldier. Epirus’ Leonidas program is a clear example of the HPM approach and the Pentagon investment pattern that follows for short-range defensive gaps. That investment signals that forces view HPM as a complementary, not a substitute, capability for dismounted RF effects.

Operational tradeoffs you must engineer for

Weight and endurance. Anything carried by a dismounted operator must be assessed in a load-out budget. Small handheld disruptors can still add several kilograms and require spare batteries to sustain patrol-level availability. Batteries also require secure warm storage and charging discipline to avoid loss of capability in cold or prolonged operations.

Spectrum and collateral effects. Jamming is indiscriminate in the absence of careful waveform control and directional antenna placement. Civilian comms, friendly radios, and GPS-dependent systems can be degraded inside the effect cone. Proper mission planning requires mapped exclusion zones, frequency notches where friendly systems operate, and training in selective engagement to avoid mission kill of your own communications. Device-level software defined radio controls and mechanical aiming reduce but do not eliminate collateral risk.

Detection before effect. A dismounted jamming weapon with no linked detection is a blunt instrument. Optimal employment pairs RF/DF detectors and passive sensors so the operator can classify and prioritize. This sequencing prevents unnecessary emissions and helps preserve spectral deconfliction with adjacent units and civil authorities. Integrated kits that combine detector and effect hardware improve situational awareness and reduce time-to-target.

Legal and policy constraints for US-based operators

In the United States the manufacture, marketing, sale and unauthorized operation of RF jammers is tightly restricted by federal law. Devices that intentionally block cellular, Wi-Fi or GPS signals are illegal for civilian use and may only be sold to or operated by authorized government entities under narrow conditions. Civilian experimentation with commercially advertised jammers can trigger heavy fines, equipment seizure or criminal enforcement. Any unit considering dismounted jamming capability must coordinate legal authority, spectrum deconfliction and clearance with relevant communications regulators and chain-of-command legal advisors prior to employment.

Tactical employment recommendations

1) Layer sensors and effects. Use passive RF detection, EO/IR and radar cues before committing a jamming effect. Effective handoff between detector and gun reduces false engagements and limits unnecessary spectrum emissions.

2) Train to aim and to minimize collateral damage. Operators must practice aiming cones, frequency notching and timed bursts. Short pulses focused on the target reduce exposure to friendly and civilian users.

3) Plan logistics for batteries and spares. Create charging SOPs, temperature-controlled storage, and swap drills. Batteries are the single largest consumable risk for dismounted EW.

4) Use doctrine-led ROE and legal review. In permissive environments a quick-response disruptor can save lives. In domestic or coalition contexts ensure explicit authority before any active RF effect.

5) Treat HPM as a system-of-systems enabler. Vehicle-mounted HPM can cover large volumes but must be integrated into command, safety and electromagnetic-compatibility planning. HPM expands options for area protection but increases complexity of force protection and logistics.

Concluding assessment

Dismounted EW systems are now an established toolkit for tactical units confronting small UAS and short-range electronic threats. Handheld jammers deliver pragmatic, low-collateral defeat against many commercial UAS when paired with good detection and rules of engagement. HPM adds a scalable option against dense or mixed threats but is not a dismounted solution in the literal sense. The correct architecture is layered: detect, classify, then apply the least disruptive effective option that meets the commander’s intent and legal constraints. Procurement and fielding should prioritize integrated sensor-effect kits, operator training, batteries and spectrum management procedures rather than a single silver-bullet device.

If you are responsible for procurement or unit training, budget for the full lifecycle: operator training, electromagnetic safety, spare batteries, detector-effect integration and legal clearance. The spectrum is now a contested battlefield axis. Success comes from managing that axis with discipline, not merely from buying the loudest transmitter.