The past nine months have shown a clear trend: small, inexpensive unmanned aerial systems are being weaponized and employed against forward U.S. positions and partner facilities with growing frequency. Adversary actors are combining off-the-shelf airframes, simple guidance packages, and low-observable flight tactics to produce high-lethality, low-cost attacks. The most visible outcome of that trend in early 2024 was the January 28 strike on the Tower 22 logistics site in northeastern Jordan, which killed three U.S. service members and injured dozens. That strike and subsequent attacks prompted large-scale U.S. retaliatory strikes against militia infrastructure in Iraq and Syria.

What we saw operationally in those incidents matters for base defense. The Jordan strike reportedly impacted living quarters and was carried out by a one-way attack drone that likely approached very low and at night to reduce detectability. Initial U.S. military assessments indicated the logistics site lacked an active kill capability able to engage the incoming system and relied largely on electronic countermeasures and perimeter security that were insufficient for that particular threat profile. Those tactical facts explain why low-cost, low-observable aerial attackers can cause outsized damage against lightly hardened positions.

A few days after the Jordan strike a separate drone attack struck a training area at the al-Omar oilfield base in eastern Syria, killing allied Kurdish fighters and wounding others. The attack was claimed by Iranian-aligned militias. Across Iraq and Syria the pattern has been repeated: rockets, mortars and small armed UAS employed by militia networks to probe defenses, attrit logistics hubs and impose psychological cost. These are not isolated novelties; they are being used in coordinated campaigns.

Tactics, techniques and procedures observed

  • Low-altitude approach. Attackers use terrain masking and night operations to stay below volume-search radar clutter and outside of many base radar elevation coverage cones. The practical effect is late or no detection by traditional air surveillance systems.
  • One-way kamikaze employment. Conversion of commercial or hobby airframes into one-way munitions removes the need for return-to-base comms and complicates attribution and interception.
  • Distributed launch and swarm concepts. Militia actors show an ability to launch multiple small UAS from dispersed ground sites, increasing the probability of at least one munition reaching the target. Open-source reporting and post-strike footage show dispersed launcher profiles and simple rail or catapult launchers.

Where U.S. bases are most vulnerable

  • Lodging and support areas. Soft-sided sleeping quarters, temporary tents, and containerized billeting clustered without stand-off distance present a high-value, low-cost target. The Tower 22 strike that hit living quarters is a textbook example.
  • Gaps in low-altitude sensing. Many fixed-base radars and ADS-B/Mode-S surveillance layers are optimized for higher-altitude traffic, leaving littoral and ground-hugging approaches under-sensed.
  • Rules, authorities and domestic limits. In permissive theater environments commanders can employ active defeat systems. In host-nation areas or on U.S. soil legal and spectrum constraints, plus risk to non-combatants and infrastructure, constrain which defeat options are available. That creates differing defensive postures between overseas and homeland installations.

Practical countermeasures and force-level recommendations Below are practical, layered measures that base commanders and security planners should prioritize. These recommendations are focused on reducing detection-to-engagement timelines and increasing the cost for an attacker to succeed.

1) Layered multi-sensor detection

  • Short-range ground-based radars tuned for small-RCS targets, combined with RF direction-finding and EO/IR cameras, significantly close the low-altitude detection gap. A fused sensor suite yields earlier cueing and reduces false alarms. Fielded JCO-led evaluations and joint service demonstrations have emphasized layered sensor-effectors at fixed and semi-fixed sites.

2) Harden critical billets and key nodes

  • Increase standoff for sleeping areas, move from tents to hardened containers when possible, provide overhead cover and fragmentation protection for portable structures, and minimize clustering of personnel at night. Physical hardening does not stop every attack but converts a single successful impact into a less catastrophic event. The Tower 22 incident shows exactly why lodgings and logistics nodes need priority hardening.

3) Active defeat layered by risk and ROE

  • Non-kinetic measures: RF jamming, home-on-GCS takeover tools, and cyber/command-link denial systems can be effective against COTS UAS when legal and safety constraints allow. The Joint Counter-small UAS Office and industry partners have been testing and integrating RF and cyber-takeover tools as part of layered solutions.
  • Kinetic measures: short-range kinetic interceptors, small autocannons, and guided munitions are necessary where non-kinetic defeat is unreliable. Combatant commands have demonstrated mixed use of kinetic effectors against Group 3 threats during force protection exercises.
  • Directed energy: high-power microwave and laser effectors are maturing but remain limited by range, power logistics and environmental factors. Where available, they can provide low-cost-per-engagement options against swarms, but they are not yet a universal solution.

4) Detection-to-defeat integration and TTPs

  • Time is the enemy. Improving automation that fuses radar, RF and EO detections, provides ID confidence, and automatically cues effectors shortens the window an attacker has to succeed. Joint experimentation exercises have highlighted the value of integrated command-and-control and pre-planned engagement authorities.

5) Intelligence and campaign-level disruption

  • Attacking the logistics and command nodes that support militia UAS operations is the only method to permanently reduce the threat. The U.S. response in February demonstrates a campaign approach of degrading infrastructure that facilitates repeat attacks. Tactical defenses reduce immediate risk while intelligence and targeted strikes seek to remove the supply and launch capacity.

6) Training and doctrine

  • Units need recurring, realistic counter-UAS training including live-fire defeat options, sensor fusion exercises, and exercises that simulate low-altitude approaches and multi-vector attacks. The Joint C-sUAS Office has organized evaluation events and demonstrations to accelerate fielded solutions and training curricula.

Operational checklist for base commanders (minimum viable measures)

  • Conduct a rapid assessment of billeting and move high-risk sleeping areas away from perimeter, implement hardened cover where possible.
  • Deploy a two- to three-sensor stack: short-range radar plus RF DF plus EO/IR, fused into local C2.
  • Define engagement authorities and safe kernel-of-action scenarios with host-nation and legal counsel for non-kinetic defeat tools.
  • Pre-position at least one effect layer that can reliably defeat Group 1-3 UAS given the local environment and ROE.
  • Coordinate intelligence-sharing with higher headquarters and host-nation authorities to identify likely launch zones and supply networks.

What civilians and hobbyists should know

  • Unauthorized flights over military installations are dangerous and illegal. Where countermeasures are in use they may interrupt civilian comms or result in the interception or recovery of the UAS. Anyone operating a UAS should avoid military bases and consult local rules and restricted airspace notes.

Closing assessment The threat environment is asymmetric: cheap UAS can impose disproportionate risk when they exploit sensing and defensive gaps. The correct response is layered and pragmatic: harden lodgings and critical nodes, field fused short-range sensors, pre-authorize legal effectors, and pursue the adversary’s logistics networks at campaign scale. Tactical fixes save lives now; campaign-level disruption reduces future attacks. The lessons from early 2024 make one operationally plain point: detection without timely defeat is not defense.