Europe’s radio environment is changing quickly and that matters for electronic warfare operators, defenders, and system designers. Two policy threads have converged in early 2024 that will reshape spectrum availability, deployment density, and how regulators expect services to share and coordinate: the EU’s infrastructure push under the new Gigabit Infrastructure Act, and a focused RSPG review of the 2 GHz Mobile Satellite Services band. Both are practical policy moves that create new opportunities and new operational risks in contested and congested electromagnetic environments.

What changed on the regulatory side

The Gigabit Infrastructure Act (GIA) is the EU’s legislative update to simplify and speed network rollout. The regulation replaces the 2014 Broadband Cost Reduction Directive and pushes greater sharing of civil works and physical infrastructure, streamlined permitting, and incentives for faster fibre and 5G deployments. The political agreement was reached early in 2024 and the new rules were made effective in May 2024. These measures are intended to densify high capacity networks across member states and to reduce time and cost to deploy sites.

Separately, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group produced a formal opinion in February 2024 assessing scenarios for the 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz (commonly referred to as the EU 2 GHz MSS band) after the current authorization horizon in 2027. The RSPG document maps options ranging from keeping the present MSS arrangements through to segmented band approaches that would open capacity to multiple operators, narrowband IoT usages, or wider non-terrestrial network D2D (direct-to-device) architectures. The opinion explicitly recommends a technology neutral approach while flagging the need for coordinated EU-level visibility before individual Member States take divergent licensing steps. It also calls for exploration of band segmentation and sets an objective timeframe for clarifying scenarios.

Why these reforms matter for EW

1) Denser networks increase the electromagnetic footprint

By design the GIA lowers administrative barriers to deploy fibre and small cells. More small cells and distributed radio heads means more transmitters and receivers operating in close proximity to each other and to civilian infrastructure. For EW this alters the electromagnetic battlespace in two primary ways. First, detection and attribution become harder because legitimate electromagnetic activity increases the noise floor and the number of valid emitters. Second, adversary denial or deception techniques have larger target sets and more ways to blend in or create plausible interference. Operators must assume more complex baseline RF scenes when planning jamming, spoofing, or protection missions.

2) Satellite D2D and MSS modernization raise sharing and interference questions

The RSPG review of the 2 GHz MSS band explicitly includes scenarios for NTN and D2D style services and recommends careful, coordinated steps to avoid fragmented national approaches. If regulators allocate parts of the 2 GHz band for satellite direct-to-device or IoT services, those signals will coexist with terrestrial mobile networks and with legacy MSS. That coexistence increases the potential for accidental harmful interference, and it creates new vectors for intentional electromagnetic attack or exploitation. In short, moving satellite services closer to consumer devices increases the number of heterogeneous emitters that EW practitioners and spectrum managers must monitor and control.

3) Policy drive toward sharing and spectrum efficiency is a double edged sword

Sharing regimes, band segmentation, and licensed-shared access improve utilization. At the same time they complicate protection criteria. Shared allocations often rely on databases, coordination rules, detector thresholds, and rapid dynamic response. Adversaries can exploit complexity by creating transient or low-power attacks that skirt protection thresholds or trigger nuisance mitigation that degrades friendly systems. That means resilience engineering must move from a single-link focus to system-of-systems thinking that factors in policy-enabled sharing mechanisms.

Operational implications and tactical mitigations

1) Update your spectrum baseline

Assume inventory increases: more cell sites, more small cells, more satellite supplemental coverage, and new narrowband IoT carriers. Rebaseline RF maps frequently using automated scanning and geolocated spectrum logging. Prioritize persistent monitoring at choke points such as ports, major junctions, and known drone operating corridors.

2) Harden PNT and command links

Policy-driven densification will not remove reliance on GNSS for many platforms. Expect regulators to permit more supplemental satellite links that can help resilience but also complicate interference environments. For critical systems: deploy multi-constellation, multi-sensor PNT; integrate inertial navigation with timely GNSS fault detection; and implement rapid fallback comms that can operate on protected narrowband channels or preplanned frequency hopping patterns.

3) Design for contested sharing environments

When spectrum becomes segmented or licensed in smaller blocks, radios must be agile. Use waveforms that support dynamic spectrum access, fast channel switching, and robust error correction. Incorporate spectrum sensing and local policy-aware radio resource management so devices can detect and avoid unintended harmful interference while sustaining critical links.

4) Invest in spectrum situational awareness and geolocation

Database-driven sharing only works if you can verify what is actually on the air. Strengthen field-deployable RF geolocation capability, automated correlation of signals-of-interest to authorization records, and analytics that can separate accidental from deliberate disruptions. For tactical EW, rapid geolocation remains the single most valuable capability to convert noisy detections into actionable targets.

5) Engage with regulators early and locally

RSPG made clear that national fragmentation is a real risk if Member States move independently on MSS renewals. That same fragmentation will create operational headaches for cross-border deployments and coalition operations. EW practitioners and system suppliers should engage with national regulators and industry stakeholders during consultations. Practical inputs include minimum protection masks, guard bands for PNT and safety-of-life services, and realistic transition timelines for incumbent systems.

Policy recommendations for the EW community

  • Push for policy language that requires testable interference protection criteria and transparent incident reporting. Without enforceable detection and reporting mechanisms, shared-use regimes will create ambiguity rather than resilience.

  • Advocate for regulatory sandboxes that include EW scenarios. Testbeds where military, commercial, and civil systems operate concurrently are the fastest way to find real world coexistence limits and to develop mitigations.

  • Support investment in spectrum monitoring infrastructure that is capable of interoperable, geolocated data feeds across national boundaries. Shared situational awareness will reduce false escalations and speed lawful enforcement.

  • Treat D2D and MSS modernization as risk multipliers. New satellite-to-device topologies increase the number of legitimate, difficult-to-characterize emitters. Put measures in place now to detect anomalous satellite or supplemental coverage behaviour and to authenticate legitimate control-plane interactions.

Concluding tactical note

EU policy in early 2024 is encouraging more infrastructure and examining how satellite services will integrate with terrestrial networks. The net effect for EW is a more complex electromagnetic environment with more legitimate emitters and more sharing dynamics. That complexity raises both risk and opportunity. The teams that build and operate resilient sensing, rapid geolocation, and policy-aware radios will have the operational edge. Regulators are receptive to input right now. If your program cares about spectrum access, performance under interference, or the safety of radio-reliant assets, the time to engage is now.