The Krasukha-4, fielded by Russia since the early 2010s, is a truck mounted, broadband electronic attack system designed to detect, deny, and degrade large airborne and space based sensors. It is built by Bryansk Electromechanical Plant under the KRET corporate umbrella and is typically described as a two vehicle complex: a high power jamming vehicle and an associated command shelter. Public technical details are sparse and many performance claims are Russian sourced, but open reporting paints a consistent picture of a long range, high power system intended to blind or confuse AWACS, JSTARS type platforms, tactical reconnaissance radars, and some classes of LEO satellite sensors.

Physically the system is a large, conspicuous asset. Photographs and manufacturer level descriptions show multiple parabolic and phased antenna elements mounted on an 8x8 truck chassis. It requires time, space, and significant electrical power to operate at full effect. That combination gives it reach and power but also creates signature and mobility constraints that shape how commanders can employ it. Deployment times, aerial coverage arcs, and the platform’s need for supportive logistics are recurring points in the open literature.

Capabilities reported in manufacturer and defence analysis pieces emphasize broadband radar and satellite uplink and downlink jamming. Public sources commonly quote disruptive ranges in the order of 150 to 300 kilometers for certain mission sets, and list X, Ku and Ka band targeting for SATCOM denial alongside lower frequency work against large airborne radars. Those range and band figures should be treated as order of magnitude indicators rather than verified engineering constants. Actual effective suppression depends on pointing, waveform, antenna gain, line of sight, terrain, and the target sensor’s own electronic countercountermeasures.

Tactically Krasukha-4 is a strategic and operational layer tool. In practice Russian forces have used it to create protected bubbles around airbases, headquarters, and force concentrations where exposure to high value ISR was a concern. In combined operations it is typically paired with passive sensors, signals intelligence, and shorter range jammers to provide graduated spectrum denial. That layered employment is intended to both deny enemy situational awareness and funnel hostile aircraft or missiles into zones covered by Russian air defenses. Open reporting from conflict zones indicates Russian commanders have placed Krasukha-class assets forward when they judged the threat from airborne ISR and precision guided weapons to be significant.

The Ukraine conflict provided one of the clearest real world tests for heavy Russian EW. Early in the 2022 invasion Ukrainian forces photographed and recovered elements believed to be the Krasukha-4 command shelter after Russian units withdrew north of Kyiv. That capture fed rapid technical analysis by Western and Ukrainian specialists and is repeatedly cited as an important intelligence gain. Subsequent reporting has also documented continued Krasukha employment across the theatre where commanders sought to disrupt drone operations, GPS guided munitions, and commercial satellite communications. Open sources and analytic centers have linked Russian EW activity, including systems like Krasukha-4, to localized GPS disruption and periods of degraded commercial satcom services in the battle area.

Those same operational reports show limits and vulnerabilities. A heavy broadband jammer is effective when it can maintain power, line of sight, and relative sanctuary from long range precision strike. It is less effective when adversaries can employ dispersion, mobility, rapid reconstitution, or nullifying tactics such as moving to alternate communications pathways, using inertial navigation or anti jamming antennas, or timing critical operations when the jammer is off line. The capture and periodic destruction or attrition of large EW trucks in theater is evidence that kinetic ops paired with ISR remain a viable counter. The capture in 2022 and later reported eliminations or strikes against EW assets underscore that heavy jammers must be defended and dispersed to survive in a contested area.

From a systems point of view Krasukha-4 illustrates classic tradeoffs in electronic attack design. High instantaneous radiated power and broad spectral coverage give the operator the ability to disrupt disparate sensors at distance. High power plus large antennas produce signature and logistics burdens. The result is a capability that is operationally valuable but inherently finite in how and where it can be used without exposing itself to counteraction. Commanders who try to ‘‘barrage’’ continuously over wide areas will run into own force fratricide and logistic strain, forcing them to make choices that clever defenders can exploit.

Countermeasures and mitigations are straightforward in principle and nuanced in execution. At the tactical level you reduce single point dependence on any single sensor or comms path. Harden navigation with inertial systems and periodic updates from multiple sources. Harden comms with frequency agility, directional links, and rapid rekeying. At the operational level use denying tactics such as rapid shoot and scoot, distributed basing, and deception to complicate kill chains. And at the campaign level combine SIGINT, multi spectral ISR, and long range precision strike to locate and attrit large EW nodes where feasible. Public reporting suggests Western and Ukrainian forces have used combinations of these measures to blunt heavy Russian EW where they could.

Practical guidance for engineers and hobbyists who read this hub: do not attempt to replicate or test high power jamming equipment. The power levels, regulatory and legal environment, and risk to safety make that a non starter outside authorized military programs. If you are studying Krasukha-class concepts from a signal processing perspective focus on waveform detection, direction finding, jammer identification, and low probability of intercept techniques. Those areas are academically tractable and provide more value for defensive planning than attempts to build high power offensive gear in a garage. Open source material is useful but remember many public figures for range and capability are proprietary or propagandistic and should be cross checked.

Bottom line: Krasukha-4 is a heavy, long reach, Russian electronic attack node that has genuine operational effect against large airborne radars and some satellite sensing modes when employed with discipline and protection. It is not an invulnerable magic box. Its power and footprint create both capability and limitations. Effective counters combine technical hardening, operational adaptions, and the integration of ISR and precision strike. For practitioners the key lessons are to understand the tradeoffs that drive both the system design and the ways it must be employed on a modern battlefield.