Introduction

Drones and electronic warfare are no longer separate phenomena on modern battlefields. They form a feedback loop in which advances in unmanned aircraft change how commanders apply spectrum denial and in which spectrum tools force drone operators to change platforms, tactics, and operational concepts. Below I examine three case studies where that intersection materially shaped outcomes: the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Russia–Ukraine fighting from 2021–2023, and large scale drone strikes in the Gulf that exposed attribution and defense challenges. Each case highlights different EW functions — suppression, deception, and exploitation — and the tactical tradeoffs for operators on both sides.

Case study 1: Nagorno-Karabakh, 2020 — drones used for SEAD and deep strike

What happened at a tactical level Azerbaijan’s campaign in the autumn of 2020 relied heavily on a combined package of long-endurance ISR and armed drones, loitering munitions, and precision fires to find, fix, and then strike Armenian air-defence units, artillery, and logistics nodes deep behind the front. The Bayraktar TB2 and various Israeli loitering munitions performed persistent ISR and precision strike roles that multiplied the effect of traditional artillery and rockets. Open-source reporting and follow on analyses by independent think tanks documented that drones were central to Azerbaijan gaining and holding local air superiority during the campaign.

EW intersection and tactical consequences The tactical synergy was not only the drones themselves but how they were integrated with suppression of enemy air defenses. Where Azerbaijani forces could isolate and strike radar and air-defence nodes, drones could operate with fewer interceptions. Conversely, Armenian forces frequently lacked modern, integrated EW layers that could reliably deny targeting data or protect their high-value emitters. The result was a force-multiplying effect for the attacker: persistent eyes on targets, rapid attribution, and precision engagement. Several post-conflict OSINT and expert reviews stressed that drones were decisive but not the sole factor; planning, training, and combined-arms coordination mattered.

Operational takeaway When an attacker can keep ISR and strike chains short and protected, legacy air-defence networks that rely on static radars or high-emitter signatures become vulnerable. Defenders need mobile, emission-controlled sensors and a layered approach that does not depend on a single sensor type.

Case study 2: Russia and Ukraine, 2021–2023 — spectrum dominance, disruption, and adaptation

What happened at a systems level During the years leading up to and including the wider invasion in 2022, a wide range of Russian EW systems were visible in theater. Truck and vehicle mounted systems such as the Leer-3 family, R-330Zh Zhitel style jammers, and larger Krasukha series assets were described in multiple technical reviews and reporting as being used to interfere with GPS, cellular networks, and wideband radio at operational ranges. Observers operating monitoring drones reported GPS interference on flights in contested areas even before full-scale operations in 2022.

Tactical effects on unmanned systems Russian EW did several things simultaneously. First, deliberate jamming and interference increased loss rates for small tactical UAS that relied on GPS or unprotected radio links. Multiple analyses found that in sectors where Russian EW was mature and densely deployed, the effective life of many quadcopter and fixed-wing tactical UAS dropped dramatically. Second, Russian units used EW for SIGINT to detect and geolocate emitters, turning radio transmissions into targeting data for indirect fires. Third, large, powerful jammers created zones in which GPS-based precision effects degraded or became unusable without alternate navigation modes. The combined effect was to force Ukrainian drone operators to change tactics, shorten link distances, shift to lower-emission operations, use burst transmissions, or accept higher attrition.

Adaptation and counter-adaptation The duel produced predictable adaptations. Drone operators moved to distributed C2, shorter line-of-sight links, and mission profiles that traded persistence for survivability. Defenders learned that large EW complexes are themselves high-value targets once their emissions are detected. Reports documented strikes directed at EW nodes after they were localized. The broader lesson is doctrinal: effective EW can shape operational tempo, but it needs integration with kinetic fires and disciplined emission control to avoid self-inflicted friction.

Case study 3: Gulf attacks and insurgent/irregular campaigns — attribution, range, and the limits of conventional defenses

What happened and why EW matters High-profile attacks on petroleum infrastructure and regional targets in 2019 and later years showed that long-range drones and cruise missiles can create strategic effects well beyond their tactical lethality. The September 2019 strikes against major oil-processing facilities were widely reported and investigated; attribution was politically contentious but technically instructive. These events showed that actors with access to long-range UAS and cruise technology can present complex multi-vector threats that are difficult to attribute quickly and that can overwhelm conventional point defenses. The Houthi campaign of intermittent long-range strikes and raids further illustrated the use of asymmetrical UAS strikes in a regional conflict environment.

EW role and defensive challenges In these cases, EW plays at least three roles: (1) hardening an attack package by denying or spoofing navigational aids; (2) protecting attacker launch and relay networks by making attribution harder; and (3) complicating defender sensors through either saturation or deception. Conversely, many infrastructure defenses are optimized for kinetic threats and are not organized to handle distributed, low-observable UAS attacks that may use commercial components and hybrid navigation. That mismatch drives both false negatives and delayed attribution.

Common patterns across the cases

1) Integration beats capability in isolation. A modest EW capability integrated with targeting and fires can have outsized effects. Azerbaijan combined ISR, strike drones, and target handoff to score operational effects; Russian EW in Ukraine was most effective when combined with artillery and fires.

2) EW creates both space and fragility. Denying an adversary access to the spectrum can create windows of tactical advantage, but EW emitters are detectable and vulnerable. A spectrum denial that is not paired with force protection invites counterattack.

3) Drones drive decentralization. As EW pressure rises, drone operations shift toward lower-latency, lower-emission, and more distributed methods. That can preserve capability but raises command and legal control challenges for commanders.

4) Attribution and escalation risks rise when civilian systems are involved. The use of commercial navigation, cellular relays, and dual-use components complicates attribution and increases the risk of miscalculation in politically sensitive settings.

Practical implications for practitioners and planners (technical but non-actionable)

  • Emission discipline matters. Units that fight without strict radio discipline are easily detected and localized by capable EW/ES systems. Hardening comms through encryption and low-power techniques helps but does not eliminate exposure.

  • Layer sensors and avoid single points of failure. A mix of passive detection, low-frequency radar, optical cameras, and human observation reduces vulnerability to a single kind of EW effect. Mobility and redundancy are force multipliers.

  • Treat EW nodes as both enablers and targets. Plan for hardening and for counter-strikes as part of a combined-arms approach. Emissions can be weaponized by an adversary; mitigation requires doctrine, intel, and strike options.

Concluding note

The cat-and-mouse interaction between drones and electronic warfare is a defining dynamic of current conflicts. Neither drones nor EW are silver bullets. The decisive factor is how these capabilities are integrated into doctrine, command systems, and logistics. For engineers and hobbyists reading this hub, the important takeaway is not a technical trick but an operational truth: spectrum effects change force geometry, and force geometry demands changes in platform design, tactics, and training. Staying ahead of that cycle requires honest post-mission analysis, investment in resilient sensing, and recognition that every emitter can reveal more than its signal.